An Act to amend the Old Age Security Act (amount of full pension)
The bill contains a positive pro-work change to GIS that reduces disincentives for working seniors, but its core feature is a permanent, across-the-board 10% OAS increase that materially raises program costs without clear productivity or competitiveness gains. On balance, the fiscal and efficiency downsides outweigh the limited labour-supply upside.
What is the five-year fiscal cost of a 10% OAS increase for 65-plus, and how will the government pay for it without higher taxes or larger deficits?
Why deliver an across-the-board OAS hike instead of targeting low- and modest-income seniors, and what is the expected reduction in seniors’ poverty rate from this bill?
What labour supply increase does the government project from raising the GIS earnings exemption, and how will this interact with the OAS recovery tax and provincial benefits to avoid unintended clawbacks?
Raises seniors’ incomes and consumption but does not directly raise growth capacity or national wealth; fiscal costs could offset benefits if financed by higher taxes or deficits.
Higher GIS earnings exemption reduces punitive clawbacks on working seniors, easing disincentives to work without adding administrative burden.
May slightly increase labour supply from seniors, but no material impact on productivity, skills, or cost competitiveness overall.
No direct link to trade, export capacity, or market access.
Primarily a transfer increase; does not target capital formation, R&D, or permitting.
A permanent 10% OAS boost increases program spending without demonstrated efficiency gains or offsets, pressuring deficits and future taxes.
While not a tax change, raising the GIS earnings exemption lowers effective marginal tax/benefit clawback rates on seniors’ work income, improving work incentives.
A sizable transfer change, but not oriented to large-scale productivity or competitiveness gains that drive broad prosperity.
Did we get the builder vote wrong?
Email hi@buildcanada.com